Why adjudicate? : enforcing trade rules in the WTO / Christina L. Davis

Introduction
Domestic constraints and active enforcement
The democratic propensity for adjudication
The litigious state : U.S. trade policy
The reluctant litigant: Japanese trade policy
Conflict management : evaluating the effectiveness of adjudication
Level playing field? : adjudication by developing countries
Conclusion
Bibliography
Index

The World Trade Organization (WTO) oversees the negotiation and enforcement of formal rules governing international trade. Why do countries choose to adjudicate their trade disputes in the WTO rather than settling their differences on their own? In Why Adjudicate?, Christina Davis investigates the domestic politics behind the filing of WTO complaints and reveals why formal dispute settlement creates better outcomes for governments and their citizens. Davis demonstrates that industry lobbying, legislative demands, and international politics influence which countries and cases appear before the WTO